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Banking competition is expected to provide welfare gains by reducing monopoly rents and 
cost inefficiencies, favoring a reduction of loan rates and then investment. These expected 
gains are a major issue for transition countries, in which bank credit represents the largest 
source of external finance for companies. With the use of exhaustive quarterly data for 
Czech banks, this paper aims to provide evidence on the effects of banking competition in 
the Czech Republic. 
First, we measure the level and evolution of banking competition between 1994 and 2005. 
Competition is measured by the Lerner index on the loan market, using data on loan prices. 
The results do not show a clear-cut trend in the evolution of the Lerner index. Second, we 
investigate the relationship and causality between competition and efficiency. We perform 
a Granger-causality-type analysis. This supports the ‘banking specificities’ hypothesis, 
according to which heightened competition can lead to an increase in monitoring costs 
through a reduction in the length of the customer relationship and due to the presence of 
economies of scale in the banking sector, in this way reducing the cost efficiency of banks. 
Therefore, our results reject the intuitive ‘quiet life’ hypothesis and indicate a negative 
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Nontechnical Summary 
Banking competition is expected to provide welfare gains by reducing monopoly rents and cost 
inefficiencies, in this way favoring investment and growth. On the one hand, a higher degree of 
banking competition should result in a lower monopoly power of banks, and therefore a decrease 
in banking prices. On the other hand, heightened competition should encourage banks to reduce 
their costs, i.e. their cost inefficiencies. This latter channel is particularly promising in terms of 
welfare gains, as the order of magnitude of the cost inefficiencies averages 50% in transition 
countries (Fries and Taci, 2005) and 45% in the Czech Republic during the period 1994–2002 
(Podpiera and Podpiera, 2005).  
The aim of our research is twofold. First, we provide evidence on the level and evolution of 
banking competition in the Czech Republic between 1994 and 2005. We measure competition 
with the Lerner index, using data on output prices. We focus exclusively on the loan market, 
which represents by far the greatest share of assets for Czech banks. Using quarterly data on all 
Czech commercial banks over the period 1994–2005, we measure the degree of monopoly power 
for each bank in the loan market and the evolution of competition over the period. The second aim 
is to investigate the relationship and causality between our measure of competition and estimated 
cost efficiency. Both the theoretical and empirical literature provide arguments for both signs of 
this relationship.  
The results do not show a clear-cut trend in the evolution of the Lerner index. We see a decrease 
in competition between the periods 1995–1998 and 1999–2000 followed by an increase lasting 
until 2002. The period 2003–2004 sees a decrease in competition with a slight revival in 2005. 
The reduction in competition between the periods 1995–1998 and 1999–2000 might suggest a 
rather relaxed period for banks after the financial turmoil of 1996–1998. The increase in 
competition during the period 1999–2002 can be attributed to the entry of foreign banks into the 
Czech banking industry, which increased considerably from 1999 onwards with the launch of the 
privatization of major banks. The subsequent (2003–2005) decrease in our measure of 
competition actually contradicts the common belief of current fierce competition in banking. This 
might actually have been a temporary situation resulting from the current absence of the threat 
of a new competitor in the Czech banking market.  
Regarding the relationship between the measure of competition and estimated cost efficiency, our 
findings endorse only a negative causality running from competition to efficiency in the Czech 
banking sector during its transition period from 1994 to 2005. This result is consistent with the 
‘banking specificities’ hypothesis, according to which heightened competition can lead to an 
increase in monitoring costs through a reduction in the length of the customer relationship and due 
to the presence of economies of scale in the banking sector, in this way reducing the cost 
efficiency of banks.  
This finding has major implications, as it casts uncertainty on the view of favoring banking 
competition from the perspective of reducing prices of financial services. Indeed, greater banking 
competition may hamper the cost efficiency of banks, which could result in higher loan rates. Market Power and Efficiency in the Czech Banking Sector   3 
 
1. Introduction 
As banks play a fundamental role in the financing of the economy, banking competition impacts 
on economic development. A higher degree of competition in banking markets is expected to 
provide welfare gains by reducing the prices of financial services and thereby accelerating 
investment and growth. These gains should in fact come from two channels of transmission. On 
the one hand, a higher degree of banking competition should result in a lower monopoly power of 
banks, and therefore a decrease in banking prices. On the other hand, heightened competition 
should encourage banks to reduce their costs, i.e. their cost inefficiencies. This latter channel is 
particularly promising in terms of welfare gains, as the order of magnitude of the cost 
inefficiencies in the banking sectors of European transition countries has been shown to average 
around 30 and 50% (e.g. Hasan and Marton, 2001; Fries and Taci, 2005). However, the literature 
emphasizes some potential negative effects of banking competition through excessive risk-taking 
by banks, which may hamper financial stability (Allen and Gale, 2004; Carletti and Hartmann, 
2002). 
The issues regarding banking competition and its effects are therefore of particular interest in 
transition countries, as bank credit there is by far the largest source of external finance for 
companies (Caviglia et al., 2002; Reininger et al., 2002). Since investment is particularly sensitive 
to a decrease in loan rates, a reduction of monopoly rents and cost inefficiencies would 
consequently impact on investment and economic growth. 
Furthermore, the transition countries underwent major changes of their banking sectors during the 
1990s. Two main tendencies distinguished the transformation of the banking sectors of these 
economies: a considerable number of bank failures, and a banking sector gradually acquired by 
foreign investors. It is therefore of utmost interest to investigate how banking competition was 
influenced by these changes in transition countries. The Czech banking industry offers a relevant 
illustration of what has happened in transition countries. The Czech Republic was considered a 
successful country at the beginning of the transition period before facing the same troubles as the 
other transition countries with bank failures and before opening up its banking sector to foreign 
investors. 
The aim of this research is twofold. First, we provide evidence on the level and evolution of 
banking competition in this country between 1994 and 2005. A major contribution is the 
measurement of competition with the Lerner index, using data on output prices. We are therefore 
able to measure the degree of monopoly power for each bank in the loan market. The second aim 
is to investigate the relationship and causality between competition and efficiency. Indeed, in spite 
of the commonly accepted view favoring a positive relationship, the scarce empirical literature in 
banking on this issue supports rather a negative link (Berger, 1995; Goldberg and Rai, 1996; 
Weill, 2004). Furthermore, the theoretical literature provides arguments for both signs of this 
relationship. Namely, the intuitive ‘quiet life’ hypothesis suggests that competition positively 
influences efficiency, whereas the ‘efficient-structure’ hypothesis, proposed by Demsetz (1973), 
predicts a negative impact of efficiency on competition, as the most efficient banks would benefit 
from lower costs and therefore higher market shares. Finally, the specificities of banking 
competition cause one to expect that competition negatively influences efficiency, as reduced 
competition allows banks to benefit from economies of scale in monitoring and from longer 
customer relationships. 4   Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera, Laurent Weill and Franziska Schobert   
 
We aim to provide evidence on the sign of this relationship for the Czech banking industry. The 
computation of Lerner indices, which provides measures of competition at the firm level, allows 
us to investigate the causality between competition and efficiency at the firm level. We perform 
Granger-causality-type estimations in order to get information on the sense of the causality 
between competition and efficiency in banking. This is an issue of considerable interest to the 
Czech banking industry, and also to the empirical banking literature as a whole. Indeed, to our 
knowledge this is the first work to investigate the causality between competition and efficiency in 
banking. We then contribute to the literature on banking in transition countries by providing the 
first investigation of the link between competition and efficiency in banking in a transition 
country. Evidence on this issue will enrich the information on the conflicting assumptions on this 
topic. Such evidence is helpful to provide the normative implications of competition policy in the 
banking industry. Specifically, a negative relationship between competition and efficiency would 
mean a trade-off between these two objectives. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the recent evolution of the Czech 
banking industry and surveys the theoretical and empirical background of the relationship 
between competition and efficiency in banking. The methodology is described in section 3, 
followed by the data and variables in section 4. Section 5 develops the empirical results. Finally, 
we provide some concluding remarks in section 6. 
2. Background 
2.1 The Evolution of the Czech Banking Industry 
The Czech Banking industry underwent massive structural changes during the economic transition 
period. The final outcome is fairly similar to that of the banking sectors in the other Central 
European transition countries, with foreign owners now dominating the banking sector.  
In the early 1990s, licenses were granted quite freely to newly created banks and the market was 
opened up to foreign bank branches in 1992. This led to a rapid increase in the number of banks 
during the early 1990s (from 9 in 1990 to 52 in 1993). The liberal licensing policy was primarily 
motivated by a desire to quickly increase competition in the banking sector. However, the 
progress with bank regulation did not keep the same pace. The banking sector was formed at a 
time when banking supervision had been defined and conceived but when no appropriate 
supervisory activities had yet been developed. 
The period from 1994 to 2005 saw two main trends. The first was the failure of numerous banks. 
Out of the 48 banks operating in 1994 and another 6 licensed later on, 21 banks had failed by 
2003. Most of these failures occurred between 1994 and 2000.1 Only 2 failures happened after 
2000, both of them in 2003. We can thus distinguish two periods regarding bank failures: the 
“troubled” sub-period 1994–2000, and the “quiet” subperiod 2001–2005. As a consequence of the 
bank failures, the number of banks in the Czech market decreased from 48 at the beginning of 
1994 to 36 at the end of 2005. 
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The second trend was an increasing share of foreign investors in the banking industry. After the 
privatization of one public bank, Živnostenská Banka, sold to foreign investors in 1992, there was 
a steady rise in foreign branches and subsidiaries specializing in providing investment banking 
and services to companies and households in the Czech market. The Czech government finally 
adopted a bank privatization program in 1998, leading to the banking sector being gradually 
acquired by foreign investors as they were expected to stabilize banks financially, improve their 
efficiency, and supply expertise in modern banking. Hence, the biggest change occurred between 
1999 and 2002 with the privatization and sale of the three largest banks2 to foreign banks. Owing 
to the failures of Czech-owned banks and sales to foreign investors, foreign investors controlled 
96.2% of the assets of the banking sector by the end of 2005 (CNB, 2006). 
The entry of foreign banks, especially through the privatization of the largest Czech banks, was 
expected to provide a substantial increase in competition. The issue of competition in the banking 
sector was often mentioned both in public discussions and among practitioners, especially given 
the fact that banks’ representatives declared that increased competition in the banking market was 
one of their goals. A surge in the number of services and products supplied, especially regarding 
loans, is the main hard fact viewed as signaling an increase in competition in the Czech banking 
sector (CNB 2004, 2005, 2006). Formally, competition has so far been measured using 
concentration indices such as the Herfindahl index, with higher concentration signaling lower 
competition and vice versa. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Herfindahl index of the Czech 
banking sector calculated for total bank assets and loans from 1994 to 2005 and the number of 
banks which were reporting to the central bank. The number of banks decreased continuously 
over the period 1994–2004, due to bank failures and bank mergers. According to the Herfindahl 
index, concentration fell continuously from 1994 to 2000 and then strongly increased from 2000 
until 2002, followed by a slight decrease between 2003 and 2005. 
Figure 1: The Herfindahl Index and the Number of Banks in the Czech Republic 1994–2005 
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Source: CNB and own calculation. 
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In addition, the Czech Republic’s membership of the EU gave licensed European banks the 
opportunity to set up subsidiaries and branches easily in the Czech Republic. Theoretically, in the 
long-run perspective, this offers the possibility of some increase in competition in the Czech 
banking sector and may consequently influence the behavior of the incumbent banks.
3 
2.2 A Brief Survey of the Link between Competition and Efficiency in Banking 
Relatively little theoretical literature has examined the link between competition and efficiency. 
As observed by Caves (1980, p. 88), economists have “a vague suspicion that competition is the 
enemy of sloth.” This suspicion is nonetheless supported by a couple of arguments in the 
literature. First, Hicks (1935) considers that monopoly power allows a relaxing of efforts.
4 This 
‘quiet life’ hypothesis resorts to the idea that monopoly power allows managers to grab a share of 
the monopoly rents through discretionary expenses or a reduction of their effort. However, the 
existence of a monopoly rent does not explain its appropriation by managers. Indeed, there is no 
obvious reason why owners of monopolistic firms would exert weaker control of managerial 
effort than those of competitive firms. Therefore, complementary theories have been suggested by 
Leibenstein (1966) and Demsetz (1973). 
Leibenstein (1966) explains why inefficiencies inside firms (the “X-inefficiencies”) exist, and 
why they are reduced by the degree of competition in product markets. X-inefficiencies would 
result from the existence of imperfections in the internal organization of firms: those 
imperfections have an impact on the level of information asymmetries between owners and 
managers. Indeed, the incompleteness of labor contracts makes the effort of managers at least 
partially discretionary. The discretionary share of the effort would not be the source of any 
problem if the owners had the means to control firm performance. But the production function is 
not known entirely. Therefore, owners cannot check the level of effort exerted by managers. 
Leibenstein then considers that the main determinant of a reduction in inefficiencies is an increase 
in competitive pressures, for two reasons. First, competition provides incentives to managers to 
exert more effort. As they are aware of the increase in competition, managers have to improve 
their performance or their firm will leave the market. Thus, managers are motivated by their will 
to avoid the personal costs of bankruptcy. Second, a higher number of firms on the market 
improves the possibilities for owners to assess firm performance relative to other firms. In this 
way they acquire a better knowledge about the production function of the firm. Owners are then 
able to make a better assessment of managerial performance and consequently to make changes in 
the management if necessary. Being informed about the comparative possibilities of competition, 
managers are inclined to exert more effort. Following Leibenstein’s , a few studies have proposed 
a formalization of his ideas (Hart, 1983; Selten, 1986; Scharfstein, 1988). Leibenstein’s X-
efficiency theory in fact lies within the scope of the “Structure–Conduct–Performance” (SCP) 
paradigm proposed by Bain (1951). According to this paradigm, market structure would influence 
firm behavior in terms of prices and quantities, and therefore firm profits. 
                                                           
3 However, we have to keep in mind the previous experience of Western European countries vis-à-vis the single 
European passport. Namely, as stressed in Dermine (2003), the effects of the Second Banking Directive 
(implementing the single European passport) were far from what was anticipated. Indeed the directive made 
cross-border expansion through branches easier, but in practice this expansion took place via subsidiaries rather 
than via branches. Moreover, at the time of the implementation of the single European passport there were 
already numerous foreign banks in the Czech banking market. 
4 This argument is summarized in the famous sentence from Hicks: “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet 
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An alternative assumption has, however, been proposed by Demsetz (1973). This predicts a 
reverse causality between competition and cost efficiency: the ‘efficient-structure’ hypothesis. He 
considers that the best-managed firms have the lowest costs and consequently the largest market 
shares, which leads to a higher level of concentration. Thus, the causality of the relationship 
between competition and efficiency is reversed in comparison to the SCP paradigm: efficiency 
determines competition. As concentration can be considered as an inverse measure of 
competition, there should then exist a negative link between competition and efficiency. 
This survey has so far only presented some theoretical references about the link between 
competition and efficiency which are not necessarily specific to the banking industry. However, 
banking markets have some specific characteristics as compared to other markets. First, banking 
markets have a structure of imperfect competition, as observed in most studies on banking 
competition (e.g. De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Weill, 2004). In fact, the 
theoretical literature in banking suggests that imperfect competition may result from the 
information asymmetries between bank and borrower in credit activity. As a consequence, banks 
have to implement some mechanisms to resolve the resulting problems such as adverse selection 
and moral hazard.
 One way out is the implementation by the bank of a customer relationship, 
meaning a long-term repeated relationship, to gain some information on the borrower. Banks can 
then reduce the problems related to information asymmetries. Nevertheless, an increase in 
banking competition may reduce the length of the customer relationship. These specific 
characteristics of the banking industry may consequently modify the relationship between 
competition and efficiency in banking. Also, according to Diamond (1984), banks have a 
comparative advantage in the ex post monitoring of borrowers, in comparison to investors, 
because of the existence of economies of scale resulting from their role of delegated monitor. 
As a consequence, competition may increase monitoring costs because of the existence of 
economies of scale and a potential reduction in the length of the customer relationship, further 
decreasing the cost efficiency of banks. In other words, the specificities of the banking industry 
provide some additional arguments in favor of a negative relationship between competition and 
cost efficiency. This assumption will be called the ‘banking specificities’ hypothesis in the 
following text. It can be argued that this assumption should be more valid in transition countries 
than in developed countries. Indeed, banks are supposed to suffer more from information 
asymmetries in transition countries, because of uncertainties of accounting information and the 
relative lack of credit risk analysis know-how of bank employees, owing to the short history of the 
market economy. 
We now turn to the empirical studies on the relationship between competition and efficiency in 
banking. Only a few studies have been performed on this issue, most of them regressing cost 
efficiency on a set of variables for market structure: Berger (1995) and Berger and Hannan (1997) 
on US banks, Lang (1996) on Western German banks, and Goldberg and Rai (1996) and Punt and 
Van Rooij (2003) on European banks. In these studies, cost efficiency is measured mostly using 
the stochastic frontier approach, while market structure is taken into account through market share 
or concentration indices. These papers tend to support a positive relationship between cost 
efficiency and concentration/market share. Therefore, they tend to be in favor of the ‘efficient-
structure’ hypothesis. In a paper devoted to Western European banks, Weill (2004) also supports 
this view, but by regressing efficiency scores on the non-structural measure obtained with the 
Rosse-Panzar model. 8   Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera, Laurent Weill and Franziska Schobert   
 
In summary, the theoretical literature provides conflicting arguments with respect to the 
relationship between competition and efficiency, while the empirical literature tends to be in favor 
of a negative relationship. It therefore seems relevant to provide new empirical evidence with 
respect to the relationship between competition and efficiency by measuring competition with the 
Lerner index and by investigating the sense of causality of this link. Furthermore, as no former 
empirical study has been done on this issue in a transition country, it is also of utmost interest to 
investigate whether the specificities of such an economy influence this relationship. 
3. Methodology 
Our aim is to investigate the relationship between competition and efficiency in the Czech 
banking industry. We therefore explain in this section how we estimate both variables. 
3.1 Measurement of Competition 
Empirical research on the measurement of banking competition provides several tools, which can 
be subdivided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and the new empirical IO 
approaches. The traditional IO approach proposes structural tests to assess banking competition 
based on the SCP model suggested by Bain (1956). The SCP hypothesis argues that greater 
concentration causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to greater profitability (meaning 
lower performance in terms of social welfare). According to this, competition can be measured by 
concentration indices such as the market share of the five largest banks, or by the Herfindahl 
index. These tools were widely applied until the 1990s. 
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the problems of 
measuring competition by the traditional IO approach. These latter measures suffer from the fact 
that they infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as market structure or market 
shares. In comparison, the new empirical IO approach infers banks’ conduct directly. 
Furthermore, it allows us to consider the actual behavior of banks by taking contestability into 
account. Indeed, as observed by Claessens and Laeven (2004), the actual behavior of a bank is 
related not only to market structure, but also to barriers to entry, influencing the likelihood of the 
entry of new competitors and therefore the behavior of incumbents forecasting such entry. 
The most commonly applied tool for assessing competition emanating from the new empirical IO 
approach is the Rosse-Panzar model. This non-structural test is based upon the estimation of the 
H-statistic, which aggregates the elasticities of total revenues to input prices. It has been applied 
in Western European countries by several authors (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Hempell, 2002; Weill, 
2004), and also by Gelos and Roldos (2004) to eight emerging countries, including three transition 
countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). This latter study concludes in favor of 
monopolistic competition in these three countries and also of the absence of a significant change 
in banking competition between 1994 and 1999. However, this paper does not use exhaustive 
information on banks, as it obtains information from the Bankscope database, from which a 
substantial number of banks are missing. Furthermore, the Rosse-Panzar model provides merely a 
characterization of the degree of competition for the banking industry as a whole. Another 
approach is the Bresnahan-Lau test, based on the estimation of a structural model with separate 
demand and supply equations (Bresnahan, 1982, 1989; Lau, 1982). This test therefore estimates Market Power and Efficiency in the Czech Banking Sector   9 
 
the mark-up on aggregate data. This approach has been applied to banking sectors from Western 
countries (e.g. Shaffer, 1993) and recently to EU countries (Lhoták, 2004). 
However, our research requires individual measures of competition for each bank of our sample 
through the period 1994–2005 instead of aggregate measures for the full sample. Therefore, we 
compute the Lerner index for each bank of the sample instead of estimating the Rosse-Panzar 
model and the Bresnahan-Lau test. 
The Lerner index has been computed in several empirical studies on banking competition (e.g. 
Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Fernandez de Guevara et 
al., 2005). It is defined as the difference between price and marginal cost divided by price. In this 
study we focus exclusively on the loan market, which represents by far the greatest share of assets 
for Czech banks.  
The price of loans is computed as ‘Total interest revenues’ divided by ‘Total net loans’, where 
‘Total net loans’ represents ‘Total loans’ from which non-performing loans have been subtracted, 
because revenues are not likely to come from non-performing loans, so not subtracting non-
performing loans would understate the price for banks having significant proportions of non-
performing loans.  
The marginal cost is based on the estimation of the cost function. We estimate a translog cost 
function with one output and three input prices, which are described in section 4. One cost 
function is estimated for each year by introducing fixed effects for banks. We impose the 
restriction of linear homogeneity in input prices by normalizing total costs and input prices by one 










where TC denotes total costs, y loans, w1 the price of labor, w2 the price of physical capital, and w3 
the price of borrowed funds. The indices for each bank have been dropped from the presentation 
for the sake of simplicity. 
The estimated coefficients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost. Indeed, 
as the marginal cost is the derivative of the total cost with respect to output (here loans), it can be 
derived that the derivative of the logarithm of the total cost with respect to the logarithm of output 
is the ratio of the marginal cost to the total cost multiplied by output. As a consequence, the 
marginal cost is equal to the product of the derivative of the logarithm of the total cost with 
respect to output (i.e., the derivative of equation (1) with respect to loans y) multiplied by the ratio 
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3.2 Measurement of Efficiency 
We compute cost efficiency, which measures how close a bank’s cost is to what a best-practice 
bank’s cost would be for producing the same bundle of outputs. It then provides information on 
waste in the production process and on the optimality of the chosen mix of inputs. Several 
techniques have been proposed in the literature to measure efficiency with frontier approaches. 
While nonparametric approaches, e.g. DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), use linear 
programming techniques, parametric approaches, such as the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) 
or the distribution-free approach (DFA), apply econometric tools to estimate the efficiency 
frontier. The cost efficiency estimation techniques are covered in more detail in Podpiera and 
Podpiera (2005).  
In this study, we adopt a distribution- free approach, in this way circumventing the main critique 
attached to the widely used SFA, namely, its reliance on distributional assumptions. Considering 
the cost function TC = f(Y, P) + ε, where TC represents total cost, Y is the vector of outputs, P is 
the vector of input prices and ε is the error term, the SFA would suppose that the error term is the 
sum of u and v, where u is a one-sided component representing cost inefficiencies, meaning the 
degree of weakness of managerial performance, and v is a two-sided component representing 
random disturbances, assumed to have a normal distribution to reflect luck or measurement errors. 
Various distributional assumptions are made for u, and the literature shows that the results are 
contingent on these assumptions. 
The DFA does not resort to distributional assumptions to separate inefficiency from random error. 
Instead, the DFA presumes that the efficiency of each firm is constant over time and that the 
random error tends to cancel out over time. Bauer et al. (1998) distinguish three different 
techniques through which DFA could be implemented in practice. In this study, we chose to apply 
DFA-P WITHIN, which is a fixed-effects model that estimates inefficiency from the value of a 
firm-specific dummy variable; each firm’s efficiency is then computed as the deviation from the 
most efficient firm’s intercept term. More precisely, we estimate the translog cost function 
presented in equation (1) for each year (four quarters), where we assume that the random error 
cancels out over the four quarters and the (in)efficiency term is computed from an estimated bank-
specific dummy variable.  
3.3 Testing the Relationship between Competition and Efficiency 
Concerning the link between competition and efficiency, the theoretical and empirical literature 
does not provide a clear-cut conclusion in favor of a positive influence of competition on 
efficiency in banking. Several hypotheses can be advanced on this relationship. While the 
‘efficient-structure’ hypothesis suggests a negative influence of efficiency on competition, the 
‘quiet life’ and ‘banking specificities’ hypotheses are both in favor of an impact of competition on 
efficiency, even if they disagree on the sign of this effect. 
We analyze the link between competition and efficiency in the Czech banking industry in a 
Granger-causality manner, formally specified in equations (2) and (3) as follows:  Market Power and Efficiency in the Czech Banking Sector   11 
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where  y represents ‘Efficiency’ and x the ‘Lerner index’. f i  represents the bank’s ‘individual 
effect’. 
Efficiency and Lerner are the yearly averages of the cost efficiency score and the Lerner index, 
respectively. i and t represent the indices for the bank and the time (year), respectively. Each 
dependent variable is regressed on its yearly lags and on those of the other variable. We resort to 
using yearly averages in order to be able to capture the genuine effect, if any, of competition on 
efficiency and vice versa. Namely, we believe that it takes time for the effect of competition on 
efficiency and vice versa to become apparent, hence such an effect could be revealed by analyzing 
yearly data rather than quarterly data, which are obviously more volatile. Following Berger and 
De Young (1997) and Williams (2004), who also pursue a Granger-causality analysis, we adopt 
four yearly lags.  
Having at our disposal a panel, we do not employ a standard Granger-causality analysis but resort 
to panel-specific methodology to estimate the dynamic equations (2) and (3). Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1989) mention the main pitfall of not accounting for panel structure, instead estimating a 
standard Granger causality by stacking all the time series cross-section observations together. 
They insist that this procedure would ignore the possibility of accounting for “individual effects” 
which would summarize the influence of unobserved variables with a persistent effect on the 
dependent variable. 
To estimate the dynamic equations represented in (2) and (3) we employ the Generalized Method 
of Moments as designed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Attanasio et al. (2000) mention that most 
studies seeking Granger-causality type estimation with fixed effects use estimators such as those 
proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arrelano and Bond (1991) (hereinafter 
“AB”). AB’s methodology first differences the autoregressive model in order to eliminate the 
individual effect and “optimally exploits” the moment conditions using the lagged values dated t-
2 and earlier of the dependent variable. This ensures efficiency and consistency under the 
asymptotic hypothesis of N/T ∞ →  (N- number of observations, T- time dimensio), provided that 
the model is not subject to serial correlation in εit, (i.e., there will be evidence of significant 
negative first-order serial correlation and no evidence of second-order serial correlation in the 
differenced residuals) and that the set of instrument variables used is valid (which is tested with 
the Sargan test). Our panel dimension fulfills the asymptotic condition of large N and small T, as 
we follow 25 banks over a 12-year period.  
4. Data and Variables 
We use monthly data reported to the Czech National Bank (CNB) for all Czech commercial 
banks
5 during the period 1994–2005, and transform them into quarterly data. We perform a 
careful investigation of the data to find and drop outliers. For the failed banks, the observations 
                                                           
5 We do not include mortgage banks, since a mortgage bank has a different production function than a 
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for the year of failure were dropped, as the data for the quarters preceding the failures were mostly 
chaotic. Furthermore, for each bank and for each year, we tried to have data for all four quarters. 
We then use an unbalanced panel.  
Two approaches are proposed in the banking literature for the definition of inputs and outputs. 
The intermediation approach assumes that the bank collects deposits to transform them, using 
labor and capital, into loans, as opposed to the production approach, which views the bank as 
using labor and capital to produce deposits and loans.
6 As our focus is on lending activity, we 
adopt the intermediation approach. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Median Mean  S.D. 
Output     
Loans (CZK billions)  14.4   53.9   92.8  
Input prices     
Price of labor (CZK thousands)  85.9 116.3 93.7 
Price of physical capital  0.09  0.137  0.122 
Price of borrowed funds  0.012  0.015  0.011 
Other characteristics     
Assets  (CZK  billions)  20.12 81.09 146.3 
Total costs (CZK millions)  305.4  981.8  1 727.8 
Price of loans  0.021  0.023  0.0122 
Source: CNB. 
Notes: N=1110 observations. 
 
One output – loans – is adopted in the cost function and the cost efficiency frontier. The inputs 
include labor, physical capital, and borrowed funds. The price of labor is measured by the ratio of 
personnel expenses to the number of employees. The price of physical capital is defined as the 
ratio of expenses for physical capital to fixed assets. The price of borrowed funds is measured by 
the ratio of expenses for borrowed funds to borrowed funds. Total costs are the sum of expenses 
for personnel, physical capital, and borrowed funds. The price of loans is computed using the ratio 
of interest received on loans to loans. Summary statistics for the period 1994–2005 are reported in 
Table 1. 
5. Results 
This section presents the empirical results. The first subsection displays the evolution of banking 
competition. We then look at whether the evolution of the Lerner index as resulting from our 
estimations is influenced by some factors, among which we consider macroeconomic variables 
(GDP growth, inflation, and the short-term interest rate) and changes in the structure of the 
banking sector (as proxied by the Herfindahl index). In the third subsection, we investigate the 
relationship between competition and efficiency. 
                                                           
6 Wheelock and Wilson (1995) and Berger et al. (1997) have shown that the choice of approach has an impact on 
efficiency scores but does not imply strong modifications in their rankings. Market Power and Efficiency in the Czech Banking Sector   13 
 
5.1 The Evolution of Banking Competition 
We present the results regarding the computation of the Lerner index. One cost function is 
estimated for each year so as to allow the coefficients of the cost function to evolve over time. 
The cost function is estimated introducing fixed effects for banks. 
Our results for each year are displayed in Table 2. One has to keep in mind that the Lerner index 
is an inverse measure of competition, i.e., a greater Lerner index means lower competition. The 
statistics of Lerner indices per year concern all the Lerner indices of the year for all banks, where 
the banks have equal weights. We also compute weighted means and medians of the Lerner 
indices, where the weights were the banks’ market shares in terms of total loans. These results for 
each year are presented in Table 3. There are no significant differences between the trends in the 
aggregated Lerner indices as emerging from the two methods of aggregation. We focus our 
comments on the median competition measures for each year as reported in Table 2. 
A first glance at the results cannot distinguish a clear-cut trend (leaving aside a decreasing trend) 
in the evolution of the Lerner index. What we can clearly discern is that during the period 1999–
2002 the Lerner index decreased, signaling an increase in competition. This episode was followed 
by an increase in the Lerner index, hence a decrease in competition, during 2003–2004, followed 
by a slight decrease in the Lerner index, hence an increase in competition, in 2005. The fact that 
the results show a negative figure for the Lerner index in 1997
7 make interpretation of the trend 
difficult for the period 1995–1998. However, a comparison between the Lerner index figures of 
1995–1998 and the almost equal ones of 1999 and 2000 suggest a decrease in competition during 
this time span. To summarize, we see a decrease in competition between the periods 1995–1998 
and 1999–2000 followed by an increase lasting until 2002. The period 2003–2004 sees a decrease 
in competition with a slight revival in 2005.  
The reduction in competition between the periods 1995–1998 and 1999–2000 might suggest a 
rather relaxed period for banks after the financial turmoil of 1996–1998. In the same respect, the 
drastic increase in the Lerner index from 1998 to 1999 was to some extent triggered by a decrease 
in banks’ marginal costs related to borrowing funds on the interbank market after 1998. The 
obvious increase in competition during the period 1999–2002 can be attributed to the entry of 
foreign banks into the Czech banking industry, which considerably increased from 1999 onwards 
with the launch of the privatization of major banks. The subsequent (2003–2005) decrease in our 
measure of competition actually contradicts the common belief of current fierce competition in 
banking. This might actually have been a temporary situation resulting from the current absence 
of the threat of a new competitor in the Czech banking market. As all the big banks were now 
sold, and as there were already many subsidiaries of foreign banks, the threat of entry of a new 
bank seemed low. Consequently, following the contestability theory, the competitive pressures on 
banks were limited. At the same time, we have to recall that our measures of competition cannot 
account for riskiness of banks’ products. Given that after 2002 banks offered a wider spectrum of 
products, some of them relatively riskier and consequently pricier, this could have triggered an 
increase in the Lerner indices to some extent.  
                                                           
7 The negative figure for the year 1997 comes from the fact that on average the MC was higher than the price of 
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Table 2: Lerner Indices per Year 
 N  Median  Mean  S.D. 
1994 87  60.13  59.01  30.97 
1995  110 16.94 13.6 49.48 
1996  99  14.73 2.46 71.12 
1997 106  -14.38  -26.88  83.67 
1998 86  8.77  10.94  24.26 
1999 99  32.16  30.76  31.73 
2000 100  30.37  31.11  23.96 
2001 92  24.4  29.12  24.79 
2002 92  17.1  17.03  27.7 
2003 88  50.95  43.44  30.93 
2004 75  55.11  45.74  27.66 
2005 76  44.8  42.09      26.67 
Notes: All indices are in percent. 
Table 3: Lerner Indices per Year: Weighted Statistics 
 N  Median  Mean  S.D. 
1994 87  113.94  102.62  19.9 
1995 110  90.61  76.59  28.17 
1996 99  41.2  37.45  19.2 
1997 106  -31.36  -31.6  20.65 
1998  86            -0.1  -0.15  10.16 
1999 99  31.21  30.08  8.28 
2000  100 13.76 9.16 16.83 
2001 92  12.19  8.07  16.7 
2002 92  -2.51  -2.46  23.82 
2003 88  7.37  13.43  30.66 
2004  75  61.13 55.1 13.09 
2005  76  25.35 25.7 21.47 
Notes: All indices are in percent. 
 
In addition, the results potentially signal convergence to the other European banking sectors. It 
has to be stressed that the empirical literature on banking sectors in developed economies 
concludes in favor of imperfect competition (De Bandt and David, 2000; Shaffer, 1993; Hempell, 
2002). Therefore, the strong foreign ownership in Czech banks might favor a still ongoing process 
of convergence toward the usual characteristics in the banking industry even if a strong level of 
banking competition is not observed. 
Moreover, bank failures provide a limited explanation for the changes in banking competition. 
Bank failures are expected to decrease competition – and therefore to increase the Lerner index – 
as they reduce the number of competitors. While the period can clearly be decomposed into a 
period with many bank failures from 1994 to 2000 and another period with only a few bank 
failures from 2001 to 2005, we do not observe a reduction in competition between these sub-
periods. This result is not surprising and is in line with non-structural measures of competition 
from the new empirical IO approaches. Here, the number of competitors does not necessarily 
constitute a satisfactory measure of competition. Market Power and Efficiency in the Czech Banking Sector   15 
 
5.2 Factors Affecting Bank Competition  
Following Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), we query whether the evolution of our measure of 
competition is affected by macroeconomic developments and changes in the structure of the 
banking sector. The theoretical literature claims that the business cycle can have an impact on 
banks’ mark-up. However, there is no agreement among the results of the theoretical models. 
Rottemberg and Saloner (1986) find that the mark-up is countercyclical, whereas Green and 
Porter (1984) find the opposite. Regarding the influence of variations in monetary policy, 
Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) claim that in periods of monetary tightening one should notice an 
expansion of margins and vice versa, as bank liabilities tend to be characterized by greater inertia 
than those of assets. Hence short-term interest-rates should enter with a positive sign. 
The results of our fixed effects panel estimates are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Factors Affecting Bank Competition 
  Dependent variable: Lerner index (%) 
 Coefficient  Standard  error 
Real GDP growth (%)        5.20***  0.88 
Inflation (%)  0.23  0.31 
Short-term interest rate (%)  -0.84*  0.48 
Herfindahl index  -0.004  0.009 
R² 0.17   
Number of observations  872   
Notes: *, **, *** denote estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
The results favor the theory of cyclical mark-ups, as the coefficient of real GDP growth is positive 
and significant. The coefficient of inflation is not significant. The coefficient of the short-term 
interest rate is negative and significant at 10%. Its sign contradicts the theoretical wisdom, 
signaling rather stronger inertia of bank assets than bank liabilities and that short-term market 
rates directly influence banks’ marginal costs. Dinger and von Hagen (2005) find that the Czech 
banking sector has characteristics of a two-tier banking system, i.e., a few large liquid banks are 
net lenders in the interbank market and refinance the loan business of small banks, which are thus 
net borrowers in the interbank market (Dinger and von Hagen, 2005). 
The Herfindahl index’s coefficient is negative and insignificant, showing no relation between 
market structure and our proposed measure of bank competition. 
5.3 The Link between Competition and Efficiency 
The results of the GMM estimation of the dynamic equations represented in (2) and (3) are 
displayed in Table 5. The Sargan test and the first- and second-order serial correlations in the 
differenced residuals are reported at the bottom of the table (AR1 and AR2). The statistics favor a 
valid set of instrument variables and a significant negative first-order serial correlation and no 
evidence of second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. The table reports the 
coefficients of the lags of the dependent variable as well as the coefficients of the lags of the 
independent variable. Of primary interest are the coefficients of the lag of the independent 
variable. For both equations (2) and (3), we test the joint hypothesis that  m δ δ δ = = = .... 2 1  are 
equal to zero, which signals whether this variable Granger-causes the dependent variable. The 
sum of these coefficients, which gives an overall measure of the effect on the dependent variable, 
is also computed for illustrative purposes on the sign of the relationship.  16   Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera, Laurent Weill and Franziska Schobert   
 
Table 5: Granger-Causality Tests 




  Coefficient  Std err.  Coefficient  Std err. 
Intercept  -0.06
***     0.011  0.06
***  0.02 
Efficiencyt-1  -0.6
***  0.12 0.11  0.15 
Efficiencyt-2  0.05 0.12 0.28
*  0.17 
Efficiencyt-3  -0.18
**   0.09    -0.11  0.14 
Efficiencyt-4  0.05     0.09  -0.05  0.14 
Efficiencyt-1= Efficiencyt-2= 
= Efficiencyt-3= Efficiencyt-4=0 
chi2(  4) =  32.94 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(  4) =    4.33 
Prob > chi2 =    0.3629 
 
∑ AR  Efficiency coefficients  -0.69
*** 0.24  0.24 0.32 
Lernert-1  0.2
***  0.07 -0.33
***  0.11 
Lernert-2  0.29
***  0.08 -0.17  0.12 
Lernert-3  0.29
***  0.08 -0.15  0.11 
Lernert-4  0.12
**  0.06 -0.12  0.10 
Lernert-1= Lernert-2= Lernert-3= 
= Lernert-4=0 
chi2(  4) =  32.69 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
chi2(  4) =  11.99 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0175 
 
∑ AR  Lerner coefficients  0.898
***   0.16  -0.77
***  0.24 
p-value AR1/AR2   0.05 / 0.13  0.000 / 0.24 
p-value Sargan   0.003  0.04 
Number of observations  1085  1085 
Notes: *, **, *** denote estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
AR means auto-regressive lag.  
 
The results show that the Lerner index positively Granger-causes efficiency – hence competition 
negatively Granger-causes efficiency – but efficiency does not Granger-cause competition. In the 
equation explaining Efficiency the coefficient of the lags of the Lerner index are jointly different 
from zero (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) and they sum up to 0.9, significant at 1%. In the equation 
explaining the Lerner index, the lags of Efficiency are not jointly different from zero (Prob > chi2 
= 0.3629) and their sum is 0.24, not significant at 10%.  
This means that competition negatively Granger-causes efficiency. This result is consistent with 
the ‘banking specificities’ hypothesis, according to which greater competition should reduce the 
cost efficiency of banks.  
In summary, our findings endorse only a negative causality running from competition to 
efficiency in the Czech banking sector during its transition period from 1994 to 2005, meaning 
that heightened competition can lead to an increase in monitoring costs through a reduction in the 
length of the customer relationship and due to the presence of economies of scale in the banking 
sector.  
The finding of a negative link between banking competition and banking efficiency suggests that 
policies favoring banking competition should take into consideration its possible effects on 
banking efficiency and therefore on financial stability. It is worth mentioning that our findings can 
be considered as a contribution to the literature regarding the trade-off between banking 
competition and financial stability (Allen and Gale, 2004). Namely, several papers have Market Power and Efficiency in the Czech Banking Sector   17 
 
underlined the possible negative effects of banking competition on financial stability, notably 
through increased risk-taking by banks. We provide another channel of transmission for the 
negative effects of banking competition through hampered cost efficiency of banks. 
The finding of a negative relationship between competition and efficiency in the Czech banking 
industry is in accordance with most studies providing results on the link between competition and 
efficiency in banking (Berger, 1995; Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Weill, 2004). However, our study 
differs from previous papers on this issue in two major aspects. On the one hand, all the previous 
papers adopted concentration or market share indices, if we except Weill (2004) using the Rosse-
Panzar model. On the other hand, unlike other papers concentrating on Western countries, we 
provide evidence on the link between competition and efficiency in banking in the framework of a 
transition country. As a consequence, this result brings some robustness to the counterintuitive 
negative relationship between competition and efficiency in banking generally observed in 
empirical studies. 
6. Conclusion 
This research provides new evidence on the link between competition and efficiency in the 
banking sector by focusing on the economic transition period of the Czech Republic. Our first 
results show an absence of increased competition in the Czech banking market between 1994 and 
2005. This may seem a surprising finding, as one may have expected that the massive entry of 
foreign investors into the Czech banking industry would have contributed to enhancing the degree 
of banking competition. However, one has to keep in mind the imperfect competition observed in 
banking markets in developed economies. 
An analysis relating the estimated panel of the Lerner index to several macroeconomic factors 
(GDP growth, inflation, and the short-term interest rate) and to a measure of banking 
concentration (the Herfindahl index) finds that the business cycle can have an impact on banks’ 
mark-ups (cyclical mark-ups), with no inflationary pressure on mark-ups but a positive 
relationship to the short-term interest rate, meaning stronger inertia of bank assets than bank 
liabilities. 
Furthermore, we analyze the relationship and causality between our proposed measure of 
competition and estimated efficiency and provide evidence in favor of a negative causality 
running only from competition to efficiency in the Czech banking sector. This finding may appear 
counterintuitive. It is, however, in accordance with the previous literature, which supports the 
existence of a negative link between competition and efficiency in banking. No increase in 
competition observed in the Czech banking industry does not necessarily reflect a bad trend. 
Furthermore, it can be explained by the fact that increased competition leads to greater monitoring 
costs for banks, owing to economies of scale and a reduction of the length of the customer 
relationship between the bank and the borrower. 
The finding of a negative link between banking competition and banking efficiency suggests that 
policies favoring banking competition should take into consideration its possible effects on 
banking efficiency and therefore on financial stability. Our work supports the literature regarding 
the trade-off between banking competition and financial stability (Allen and Gale, 2004; Carletti 
and Hartmann, 2002). 18   Anca Pruteanu-Podpiera, Laurent Weill and Franziska Schobert   
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